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Sensitive Plants and Senseless Weeds: Plants, Consciousness, and Elizabeth Kent
Leila Walker, Queens College

When a group of researchers recently tested the effects of anesthesia on plants, they made a
remarkable discovery: when trapped in a glass container filled with ether gas, or when drinking from
roots soaked in lidocaine, the plants appeared to lose consciousness.1 The fronds of a pea plant
stopped swaying and drooped. A Venus fly trap ignored the sensation of a simulated bug crawling
across its leaves. Mimosa pudica--often called “the sensitive plant” in reference to the way it appears
to withdraw from human touch, and known to Romanticists for Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem of the
same name--did not withdraw. When the drugs wore off, the plants appeared to regain
consciousness. Plants, the popular press was quick to report, might have a consciousness to lose.2
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Implicit in the incendiary language of the popular press is a crude working definition of
consciousness. Consciousness, in the sense used here, is not just the capacity to respond to external
stimulus, but the capacity to withdraw--and to be vulnerable to the loss of the capacity to withdraw.
Consciousness, so defined, is not only inherently intersubjective: it is confirmed through a
particularly violating intersubjective relationship. Plants can respond to touch, and they can be
forced to endure touch against what might best be called their will.
These experiments, and the popular reports on them, provoked a swift rebuke from
dissenting scientists. Devang Mehta, a biologist at the University of Alberta, replied at length to the
question in the New York Times headline: “Sedate a Plant, and It Seems to Lose Consciousness. Is It
Conscious?” “The answer,” Mehta wrote, “unreservedly, is ‘no.’”3 He pointed out that the actual
report made no claims about “consciousness,” although he also recalled that a previous study by the
same lead scientists had been widely criticized for relying “on superficial analogies and questionable
extrapolations.” While he could find little fault, “scientifically and methodologically speaking,” with
either experiment, he expressed concern that a collective uncertainty about what “consciousness”
means and how one might test for it might lead non-scientific readers to misinterpret behavior that
“looks to us” like the behavior of consciousness. The language of the popular press, he lamented,
inevitably turned to the language of analogy and anthropomorphism.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mehta’s plea for scientific accuracy in popular reports had little
effect. Not long after, when a different study found that a plant’s genetic response to touch hindered
its growth, popular headlines claimed that “plants don’t like touch,” and they might even “hate” it.4
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Green thumbs were warned to back off. While presumably hyperbolic, these reports assign to plants
not only an awareness of their environment, but actual feelings about that environment and the kind
of care (or harm) inflicted on them by others. But as Danny Chamovitz, Director of the Manna
Center for Plant Biosciences at Tel Aviv University, argued, awareness does not necessarily indicate
self-awareness, or consciousness. “We care about plants,” he writes, “do they care about us? No.”5
It would be easy to read this back-and-forth as a case of weary scientists battling a
stubbornly ignorant public. But such a reading would neglect the way that genre affects how we ask,
and answer, these questions. It is not so much, I would argue, that it is wrong to suggest that plants
are conscious, or feeling, or caring; while these claims may be unsupported by existing scientific
evidence, they reveal the gap between a scientific and literary approach. The implicit questions that
lurk behind the popular headlines have less to do with chemistry, or genetics, or the ability to feel
without a brain, than they do with the responsibility we, as humans, might bear toward beings that
are simultaneously so like us and so unlike us. As František Baluška, one of the lead authors of the
2018 study of the effects of anesthesia on plants, replied when a journalist asked if his findings
indicated that plants are conscious, “No one can answer that because you cannot ask them” (Klein).
One imagines a sly wink, but Baluška’s answer does more than just side-step the question: it reminds
us of the limits of our own capacity to infer from observation when our perspective is limited by our
own embodiment. Perhaps even more telling is what Baluška does not say. Baluška does not say, “No
one can answer that because plants cannot tell us”--the failure, if it is a failure, lies in our capacity to
ask.
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The questions raised by these experiments are not new. But the concerns revealed by this
experiment strike me as particularly Romantic in the way they attempt, and largely fail, to navigate
questions of subjectivity, sociality, and the limits of our capacity to know the other. And, in fact, a
recent scientific article criticizing the field of “plant neurobiology” accused its proponents of
engaging in a “new wave of Romantic biology.”6 The rhetoric surrounding the effects of anesthesia
on plants illuminates three key philosophical points that blur scientific and poetic modes of inquiry,
which I will address here: first, the social sensitivities and insensitivities that define consciousness;
second, the limits of our human capacity to meaningfully observe beings that are fundamentally
unlike us; and third, the ethical considerations raised by differences that cannot be bridged by either
science or language. These concerns, I argue, are central to Elizabeth Kent’s Flora Domestica (1823)
and Sylvan Sketches (1825), both botanical works that double as literary anthologies. Kent, long a
neglected figure in literary studies, has received some scholarly attention of late for her contributions
as a botanist or for her role in the intertextual sociality of the Cockney Circle--but rarely both
together. However, severing Kent’s literary project from her scientific project erases the gap
between literary and scientific knowledge that her work exposes. In a time when the distinction
between science and poetry could frequently blur, Kent’s works navigate these boundaries with
particular attention to the kinds of relationships each entails. In so doing, I argue, she advances an
ethics of care attuned to consciousnesses beyond our understanding, rooted in the contested
borderland between scientific and poetic knowledge.
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1. Sensitive Plants.
The ability of certain plants to move, to respond to external stimulus, has been studied for
centuries, and experiments on this responsiveness tend to reflect the concerns of their historic
moment. A 1925 study by Jagadis Chandra Bose found that plants, specifically the sensitive plant,
can both feel, and feel inebriated; the New York Times headline announced that plants “like alcohol.”7
In 1969, Robert M. Maniquis was inspired to write his study of sensitivity and plant symbols in
Romanticism by experiments conducted by H. L. Armus, psychologist at the University of Toledo,
which suggested that plants, like Pavlov’s dogs, could be conditioned.8 Ken Yokawa, František
Baluška, and the team of scientists responsible for the 2018 experiment on the effects of sedation on
plants were inspired in part by the work of the 19th-century scientist Claude Bernard, whose
experiments between 1868 and 1878 demonstrated that application of ether could render Mimosa
pudica unresponsive.9 Building on William T. Morton’s 1846 discovery of anesthesia, Bernard
hypothesized that plants and animals shared a common sensitivity to changes in their environment,
and concluded in his 1878 Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux that
“What is alive must sense and can be anesthetized, the rest is dead.”10 At the end of the 18th
century, experiments testing the effects of Galvanism on a variety of plants (the sorts of experiments
concerning the power of animation in dissected frogs that in part inspired Frankenstein) produced
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mixed results.11 Botanist and author Maria Jacson suggested that these Galvanic experiments might
be refined to more definitively resolve the question of plant sensitivity, and noted that “[t]he effect
of the electric fluid is similar, when administered to excess, in its power of destruction, both to
animal and vegetable life; and, on the contrary, according to late experiments, electricity, carefully
made use of, has been found salutary to the individuals of each kingdom” (18). Common to all these
experiments is the notion that plants might share with us not only particular sensitivities, but also
vulnerabilities. To be sensitive, to be alive, to be animate, is to be open to the violence of scientific
experiment.
These experiments also reveal an anxiety, particularly acute in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, that distinctions between life forms (or even between life and death) might be too close
for comfort. The Linnaean system relied on observable, taxonomic distinctions to name and
categorize species, working off strict analogies to group like with like. As Theresa M. Kelley has
argued, “Romantic era frictions between the ambition to name and classify all plants and a strong
suspicion that plants might ‘confound’ any system devised to accomplish this goal, together with its
middle position among the kingdoms of nature, made botany an epistemic minefield.”12 Yet, as
“eighteenth-century experimentalists gathered evidence that some species had traits that resembled
species that belonged to other kingdoms, it became more difficult to insist on” their separation (7).
Plants, especially the sensitive plant, destabilized taxonomic order (5).
Maria Jacson’s Sketches of the Physiology of Vegetable Life (1811) explicitly invites readers to take
up the question, still apparently unsettled, “Whether vegetables are possessed of faculties which may
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entitle them to a place amongst the animal orders of the creation?” (6).13 Drawing analogies between
the movement, form, and appearance of various plants and animals, Jacson boldly claims, “By
attentive observation of the motions of vegetable life, we discover in plants an appearance of
volition equal to that which manifests itself in various tribes of the animal creation” (11-12). The
exact phrasing of this claim deserves attention, because it illuminates both the power and the
limitations of scientific observation. Although Jacson insists that scientific experimentation had not
yet provided a satisfactory rationale for distinguishing plants from animals, she upholds the
foundational principle that “attentive observation” will, eventually, yield at least the “appearance” of
an answer. Yet Jacson’s linguistic waver is revealing: can science infer volition from the appearance of
volition? And can scientific methodologies reliant on the power of observation go beyond the
observable?
Maria Jacson was not alone in questioning the dependability of traditional boundaries
between plant and animal in the classification of life forms, although most scientific literature of the
time dismissed the apparent motion of plants as “merely external,” and not evidence of a vegetable
will.14 But while the science of plants struggled with strict distinctions between forms, writing about
plants likewise blurred generic boundaries, and these generic crossings allowed authors the freedom
to explore more extreme analogies. In Erasmus Darwin’s The Botanic Garden (1791),
anthropomorphized (and often highly sexualized) plants expressed sensation, desire, emotion, and
agency in the poetic sections, while extensive footnotes provided scientific explanations for the
poetic imagery. Lush botanical illustrations, some of which extended on fold-out pages beyond the
limits of the book, underscored the implicit connection between scientific and artistic aesthetics,
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while suggesting the uncontainable excess generated through such crossing. As Dahlia Porter has
trenchantly argued, Darwin’s mode of interweaving scientific notes and poetry, while keeping the
two forms visually distinct on the page, effectively plots “a relationship between these realms
without conflating their functions or goals.”15 Darwin mobilizes textual form to negotiate (and
transgress) the boundary between scientific and poetic knowledge.
The generation following Darwin adopted, in various ways, elements of this composite form,
experimenting with combinations of poetry and scientific notes. In Charlotte Smith’s Conversations
Introducing Poetry (1804), for example, children learn the names and characteristics of various plants
through dialogue with a patient mother who intersperses bits of poetry throughout her lessons. In
Smith’s posthumously published Beachy Head (1807), the long poem is followed by extensive and
exacting scientific notes. Frances Arabella Rowden’s A Poetical Introduction to The Study of Botany (1801)
treated botanical themes in poetry without Darwin’s overt sexualization, and the eighth edition of
Priscilla Wakefield’s Introduction to Botany included Sarah Hoare’s Poem on the Pleasures and Advantages of
Botanical Pursuits in 1818.16 Taken together, these texts represent the brief emergence of a hybrid
genre of literature that presented science and poetry as mutually constructive yet not entirely
compatible.
It was in this context of scientific, literary, and aesthetic experimentation that Elizabeth Kent
published her Flora Domestica and Sylvan Sketches. In these collections, Kent treats common plants (in
Flora Domestica) and trees (in Sylvan Sketches) in alphabetical order by common name, from Adonis to
Zygophyllum and Acacia to Yew. Each entry begins with the common name of the plant, centered
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on the page in large font, followed by a secondary name, when available, in a slightly smaller font.
On the next line, the plant’s Latin name is given in small caps to the left, and the plant’s
classification according to the Linnaean sexual system is given in small caps to the right. A brief
summary of the etymology of the plant’s name follows in smaller font. The body of the entry
provides, in no consistent order, information about the plant’s defining characteristics, its origin and
habitat, and proper care, as well as its appearances in mythology and literature. These texts, as their
title pages proclaim, are illustrated not with lavish botanical drawings, but with “the works of the
poets,” and the works she excerpts range from classical to Cockney, with little concern for
chronology or connections beyond the botanical.
The organization of the information of the page privileges a particular kind of reading in
Kent’s works. Darwin’s Botanic Garden revels in the chaotic jumble of forms, as poetry, notes, and
illustrations knock elbows on the page, and while the names of plants are visually emphasized within
the text, the headings tend rather to interrupt the poem with Interludes than to indicate order. It is a
poem that seems designed to disorient, yet it is also clearly intended to function as a single,
disorienting whole (indeed, it is the unity itself that disorients). Smith’s Beachy Head confines its notes
to the end of the volume, and the text of the poem gives no indication that the reader might pause at
any point to consult these notes. Although Smith herself was not involved in the final form of the
published work, the structure urges readers to read the text as a whole, without interruption. Her
Conversations Introducing Poetry, on the other hand, is organized into ten conversations, structured as if
they were dialogue in a play; snippets of poetry are introduced by characters as they recite lines they
have memorized. The book is structured to function pedagogically, allowing children to learn an
ordered series of lessons alongside the characters in the book. Kent’s works, however, are structured
as reference materials, with key identifying information made visually prominent, presumably to aid
a reader flipping through the pages to find a particular entry. Kent provides a preface, but no
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unifying narrative. Rather, the reader might take up the book for a quick consultation about a
particular plant, then set it back down. That is, the book is structured to facilitate engagement with a
particular plant, to facilitate understanding of its ecological and literary habitat as constructed by
Kent.
In Kent’s works, science and poetry combine to illuminate a social dynamic, an affective
relationship between humans and plants, and she pays particular attention to the human behaviors
that might cause a plant to literally or metaphorically engage or withdraw. Both Flora Domestica and
Sylvan Sketches, as Kent made explicit in the preface to each, were intended to serve as
“introductions” in two senses: to introduce botanical knowledge to beginners in the field, and to
serve as social introductions as between mutual friends. “[T]he intention of this volume,” Kent
writes in Sylvan Sketches, “is to give an unceremonious introduction of certain trees and shrubs to our
readers, who are occasionally in the habit of meeting them without being acquainted, in many
instances, even with their names.”17 She assumes that her readers have “met” these plants, but,
“utterly ignorant of their wants and habits,” have seen them “die one after the other, rather from
attention ill-directed than from the want of it.”18 Like the plants of scientific experiment, Kent’s are
vulnerable, and sensitive--but they are vulnerable and sensitive in a very social sense, and this social
vulnerability makes them frustratingly demanding companions, unable or unwilling to respond to or
reciprocate our attentive care. The botanical knowledge conveyed in these pages is primarily a social
knowledge, caught up in paying attention in a very particular way to beings that have “wants and
habits” that they cannot communicate for themselves.
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Kent’s plants are responsive to human action (or inaction), and they also elicit human
response. While Kent does not go so far as to imbue plants with consciousness, Kent portrays the
intersubjective relationship between plants and humans as supporting and generating human selfawareness. In the preface to Sylvan Sketches, Kent writes,
To attempt to enumerate the uses of the vegetable productions were to enter upon an
endless theme indeed; as vain would it be to attempt to describe their beauties; but there is
something beyond mere use, something beyond mere beauty, in their influence upon the
human mind;--there is something in flowers and trees which excites our kindest sympathies,
which soothes our keenest sorrows (xv).
Kent does not specify what that “something” is, or what the nature of those “kindest sympathies”
might be when they are “excited” by a nonhuman subject. But their “influence upon the human
mind” cannot be satisfactorily explained by either practical “use” or poetic “beauty.” Kent calls
attention to the interplay between scientific and poetic modes of knowledge at work in her project
(and in other contemporary examples of this hybrid genre), while also calling attention to the limits
of each mode, to the meaningful social encounters that we enter into with the vegetable other
“beyond” our capacity to know that other.
The influence of plants on the human mind is particular to plants, as Kent makes clear when
she compares human-animal relationships to human-plant relationships. “A man may indeed,” she
writes:
love his horse or his dog, his monkey or his cat; may fondle a young tiger, or make a
companion of a pet bear; but he will not lounge in a menagerie with his book, take a walk to
Exeter Change to relieve his melancholy, or retire to his stable, or his dog-kennel, at twilight,
to indulge in tranquil meditation. If he be weary, he will love to repose in the shade; if he be
sad, he will love to wander in groves and woods; and, at the approach of sunset, he will
doubly enjoy his book, his own thoughts, or the conversations of his friend, if he be seated
under his favourite tree (Sylvan xvi).
This passage has always struck me for its similarity to the Winnicottian holding environment which
Nancy Yousef has extended to include the poetic frame of mind supported by the silent presence of
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the other.19 In Yousef’s analysis, the supporting other, who makes no demands on the poet’s
attention yet holds a place to which he may return, is by definition a conscious being who has
withdrawn--or, rather, allowed the poet to withdraw without consequence. We cannot ascribe
consciousness to the groves and woods Kent describes here, but their effect on the poetic mind
mimics that of a consciousness that does not make demands on our attention.20
How to accord this withdrawn presence with the demanding plants of Flora Domestica, dying
of “attention ill-directed”? What’s taking shape here is a very social relationship in which the equal
subjectivity of the beings involved cannot be assumed. Like the sensitive plants of scientific
experiment, Kent’s plants display vulnerability, perhaps even something approaching volition in
their apparent “wants and needs.” Yet Kent’s plants cannot be understood through analogy to
human or even animal consciousness. Rather, they participate in social exchanges that indicate a
kind of consciousness that cannot be reduced to the knowable.

2. Social Poets, Textual Ecosystems
Romanticism’s social mind, as John Savarese demonstrated, has received increasing scholarly
attention over the past two decades as what Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite describe as
“Romanticism’s traditional identification with the lone poet, withdrawn into productive
introspection” has given way to scholarship celebrating the poetic school, the social network, the
intersubjective experience, and the interaction.21 Even the lone poet, as Kent’s description in Flora
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Domestica illustrates, relies on the implicit support of a surrounding consciousness. Perhaps no
school exemplified Romanticism’s poetic sociability so much as the Cockney School centered
around Leigh Hunt. As Jeffrey N. Cox argued in an early study of Romantic sociability, the Cockney
poets, who at times included Keats, Shelley, Byron, and others, sought “to represent in verse the
group and its life” by incorporating poetic dedications, poems written for Hunt’s contests, and
frequent invocations of other members of the group in an extensive intertextual network.22 In many
ways, Kent’s botanical projects follow this pattern, reconstructing the social network of the Cockney
School as a textual network. And by placing poetry from the Cockney School alongside classical and
canonical poets including Milton, Ovid, Tasso, and Shakespeare, she elevates her community into an
established poetic lineage outside the boundaries of time.
But consider for a moment Kent’s actual position regarding the Cockney Circle. On the one
hand, Kent often shared a home, even in gaol, with Leigh Hunt; she hosted social and intellectual
gatherings and helped establish the “poetic retreat from society” that allowed the circle to thrive.23
But on the other hand, Kent was very much on the margins of the circle she had helped cultivate.
Her fits of temper alienated even her closest friends, and until recently she was best known for “the
anecdote that she threw herself into the pond at Hampstead one morning while Keats was waiting
for his breakfast.”24 Even Hunt, who helped Kent gather the poetic specimens that illustrated her
works, belittled her botanical work, writing in 1824 that “I think your little book,” referring to her
1822 collection of children’s stories, “beats your large one.”25 And his sonnet “To Miss K., Written
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on a Piece of Paper Which Happened to Be Headed with a Long List of Trees,” literally erases her
botanical work in favor of “two things richer far, / A verse and a staunch friend.”26 While Kent
could represent in text the social circle of the Cockney School, it was difficult for her to participate
in the actual social and literary life of the circle.
Kent’s project is not just in conversation with the social constructs of the Cockney School;
she is literally constructing that social network as a text. But also, and crucially, she is constructing that
social network as a botanical text. While the Cockney poets incorporate intertextual elements and
performative sociability into their poetic projects, Kent draws on the structure of botanical
collections to frame her poetic anthologizing. Kent describes her botanical works as illustrated
“from the works of the poets,” and as Dahlia Porter recently argued, illustrations in botanical books
at this time often functioned epistemically, “putting forward particular knowledge claims that may
corroborate--but also extend, displace, or contradict--the import of the printed text.”27 Kent’s
“illustrations” function similarly, extending and complicating the claims asserted by a botanical work
organized around Linnaean classifications. But this structure also complicates the claims that might
be made through poetry or the interpretation of poetry. In a separate essay, Porter argues for an
understanding of early 19th-century literary collections as borrowing from the scientific tradition of
presenting botanical specimens.28 Literary collections similarly gathered poetic “specimens” that had
been ripped out of context (as one might remove a cut plant from its ecosystem) and presented as
demonstrating the observable characteristics of a type. In this way, editors assembled literary
anthologies that resemble scientific study. Although Porter does not mention her, Kent’s work
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exemplifies the use of botanical collections to materially structure a poetic anthology. While Kent
represents the social network of the Cockney School as a textual artifact, she also literally presents
poetry in place of botanical specimens. Kent works on multiple registers of epistemic displacement
to engage with and intervene in both poetic and scientific modes of knowledge construction.
Kent explicitly connects botanical collecting and the emerging form of the poetic anthology
by 1825. At the time it was written, Sylvan Sketches would have had a double meaning: as Porter
pointed out in another context, “sylvan” referred not only to trees, but also to “[c]lassical literary
miscellanies.” Sylvae, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, were “‘collections of poetical pieces,
of various kinds, and on various subjects’” (Science 161). And in the updated preface to the 1825
second edition of Flora Domestica,29 Kent compares her editorial project to the practice of flowercollecting, suggesting that what she chooses to include, and what she chooses to leave out, is less
determined by a desire to collect the very best, than a desire to demonstrate the beauty found in a
range of poetic endeavors. “There is an inspiration,” she writes, “in the works of nature which gives
a more than usual power even to talents of a common order, when treating of them; and although
we take greater delight in the rose, the violet, or the lily, we also love to pluck from the hedge-side
the hawthorn and the ragged-robin.”30 Kent supports this claim by quoting Wordsworth on “the
inclination we have to gather wild flowers”:
We paused, one now,
And now the other, to point out, perchance
To pluck, some flower or water-weed, too fair
Either to be divided from the place
On which it grew, or to be left alone
To its own beauty (xxxiv-xxxv).
29
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While practical limitations of physical space prevent Kent from including all the “hedge-flowers of
poetry” she might, Kent reminds us that both the practice of collecting flowers and the practice of
collecting poetic excerpts involves an act of displacement that borders on violence as these
specimens are removed from their ecosystems.
The imaginative home that a poet builds to surround the plants he observes, Kent suggests,
form an artificial ecosystem of textual associations. This ecosystem, she stresses, differs distinctly
from the ecosystem that might be scientifically observed. “If flowers have so much beauty in
common eyes,” she writes:
what must they be in the eye of a poet, which gives new charms to every object on which it
gazes! A poet sees in a flower not only its form and colour, and the shadowing of its verdant
foliage--his eye rests upon the dew-drop that trembles on the leaf; a gleam of sunshine darts
across, and gives it the sparkling brilliancy of a diamond. He sees the bee hovering around,
buzzing its joyous anticipation of the honey he shall draw from its very heart; and the
delicate butterfly suspended as it were by magic from its silken petals. His imagination, too,
brings around it a world of associations, adding beauty and interest to the object actually
before his eye (xxxvi).
In this passage, Kent articulates a distinction, which Richard M. Ness has noted in the poetry of
John Clare, between the “decontextualized observation” of “experiment” and the “contextualized
observation” of “experience.”31 Seeing a flower by its distinguishing (and classifying) characteristics of
“form and colour” is not seeing the full environment of a particular and vivid moment in time that
also includes dew, and sunshine, and the economy of bees. But, crucially, the poetic mode of
observation is also not the experience of observation in the moment: the poetic observation extends
beyond the plant and its context to “a world of associations” in the poet’s own mind. As Ness says
of Clare, Kent’s passage “makes visible how aesthetics and science can be complicit in ecological
harm. The scientist removes the insects [or plants] from their environment, while aesthetic
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conventions impose forms onto the environment” (17). But Kent is not arguing for resistance to
either scientific or poetic decontextualization; rather, she is making use of both methods in order to
perform an act of displacement herself as she plucks poetic specimens from their environment.
Kent uses the formal structure of botanical science to decontextualize, recontextualize, and
contain the textual artifacts of a very social group of poets. While the practice of collecting botanical
specimens disrupts the natural ecosystem, Kent acknowledges that her collection of poetic specimens
disrupts and decontextualizes in order to imagine alternative poetic ecosystems, to create a new
whole. She imposes a new structural environment onto the scraps of poetry she has gathered in a
creative act that deserves to be recognized as an aesthetic intervention.

3. Senseless Weeds
The whole that Kent creates, she acknowledges, does not replicate the ecosystem that the
poets represented would choose to inhabit. Yet that is exactly the point. In her preface to Sylvan
Sketches, Kent explains her decision to bring together poetry by authors who would not voluntarily
socialize: “Wordsworth speaks somewhere,” she writes:
of the tenderness of feeling excited by trees and flowers, a tenderness which, in the absence
of those we love, is often wasted on the senseless weed. It is a conviction of this kindly
influence of nature that has emboldened the writer to bring the most opposite parties
together amid these woody scenes; not hesitating even to place Mr. Southey by the side of
Lord Byron, without fear of the consequences, but rather indulging a faint hope that they
may shake hands and be friends before they return to the irritating bustle of towns and cities
(xix).
The outpouring of “feeling” that might be seen as “wasted on the senseless weed,” Kent
reconceptualizes as integral to a friendliness that embraces fellow-feeling across difference. Her
poetic reconfigurations productively redirect feeling, generating artificial affective networks that
might, like poetry, have the tendency to become the truth they describe.
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Many botanical writers of this period, particularly those who, like Kent, also wrote for and
taught children, emphasized the value of careful observation leading to accurate identification.32 And
while Kent proposes to “introduce” plants to readers who might not even know their names, and
provides careful descriptions that would allow readers to identify each plant, she also treats with joy
the encounters made possible only through mis-identification. “Ariosto,” she writes:
although utterly ignorant of botanical science, took even an infantine pleasure in his little
garden; and we are informed by his son, that after sowing a variety of seeds, he would watch
eagerly for the springing of the plants, would cherish the first peep of vegetation, and having
for many days watered and tended the young plant, discover at last that he had bestowed all
this tenderness upon a weed; a weed, perhaps, which had choked the plant for which he had
mistaken it (Flora xiv-xv).
Rather than mourn the plants lost to Ariosto’s failure to carefully observe and identify them, Kent
celebrates his cultivation of the weed: “Who can read this anecdote of so great a man,” she exults,
“and not feel an additional interest in him! In how amiable a light it represents him!” (xv). In this
charming anecdote, Ariosto’s tenderness of feeling is affirmed through his failure to accurately
observe the plants he nurtures. He cannot distinguish between the plants he intends to care for and
the weeds that killed them--but the care persists beyond observation, classification, and intention.
While this story is clearly delightful and entertaining and light-hearted, it also suggests a profound
disconnect between what is observable and what is ethical.
Indeed, how poignant, given her struggles to find acceptance within her own social circle, is
her description of the sensitive plant:
Like human beings, they are more sensitive in proportion to the tenderness of their nursing;
like them, by living hardily, they may be fitted to bear the common chances of life. In the
plant, this nervous sensibility is encouraged for its singularity; it is pity there should not be
the same reason for encouraging it in the human species (Flora 247-248).
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While many scientists and poets, in her time and ours, marveled at how the motion of the sensitive
plant appeared to mimic the motion of human feeling, and used this similarity as the basis for
analogical or allegorical links between plants, animals, and humans, Kent turns our attention to the
ethical responsibility entailed in observing sensitivity in another. “Many persons have endeavoured
to ascertain the cause of the sensibility of these plants,” Kent continues:
but it has never yet been clearly explained. The degree varies in the different kinds: some will
only contract their leaves on being touched; others will bend and recede, as it were
courteously to acknowledge your approach; as that which is termed the Humble-plant (248).
That the cause of the plant’s sensitivity cannot be ascertained is not, for Kent, as ethically relevant as
the social relation implied by its sensitivity. And this is important, because it suggests a subtle
critique of our ability to develop social structures around observable interaction and intention. We
cannot derive volition from the appearance of volition in the sensitive plant; nor can we expect the
“senseless weed” to reciprocate the “tenderness of feeling” it might excite. We can observe how
other beings respond, or fail to respond, to human contact, but this, ultimately, tells us more about
what we are capable of recognizing as sensitivity than anything else.
It would be easy to read Elizabeth Kent’s guides to the treatment of plants as metaphorical
guides to the treatment of humans--and they are. They recall to us the joy of the accidental
encounter, the importance of care for care’s sake, the value in uniting, as Shelley put it, “all
irreconcilable things” through acts of imagination.33 But to read Kent’s works as solely metaphorical
would neglect how nimbly Kent negotiates the permeable boundary between poetry and science.
While Darwin and Smith, as we have seen, engaged with both poetry and science in The Botanic
Garden and Beachy Head, typographical and structural cues keep poetic and scientific modes of
knowing distinct within each text. And although, as Porter has argued, the poetry does more than
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decorate the science, and the science does more than rationalize the poetry, it is also apparent that
these authors carefully guard against confusion between the two. In Kent’s works, however, science
and poetry cohabitate easily within each entry, and this is important because it allows us to imagine
bridging the gap between scientific and poetic ways of knowing.
While the gap between science and poetry is made literally, visibly apparent in the physical
structure of The Botanic Garden and Beachy Head, no such structural cues call attention to a knowledge
gap in Flora Domestica and Sylvan Sketches. Instead, Kent moves quickly between scientific
observation, poetic illustration, and her own act of interpretation mediating between the two. In the
entry on the Mimosa, for example, she begins by providing instructions for the proper care of the
plant before comparing its care to the proper care of humans, then turns back to the practical matter
of proper potting and watering, summarizes the scientific failure to explain the plant’s movements,
excerpts relevant selections from two poems, and finally concludes by describing the plant’s natural
habitat. Natural segues do not always connect this jumble of associations. Rather, poetry and potting
are treated as equally important to the plant’s “biography” and proper care. But there remains a gap
between poetic and scientific modes of knowing, which Kent makes clear in a later discussion of the
sensitive plant.
In the preface to Sylvan Sketches, Kent returns to the poetic treatment of the Mimosa, in this
case highlighting a Matthew Prior poem in which Solomon asks the learned:
Whence does it happen that the plant which well
We name the sensitive, should move and feel?
Whence know her leaves to answer her command,
And with quick horror fly the approaching hand?
Kent interprets:
The learned could not answer these inquiries; neither could they have explained why certain
plants are so choice in the selection of their friends, that they will turn from such as do not
please them. We cannot suppose this to be without reason: plants are too amiable to indulge
in causeless antipathies (xxxii).
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In this passage, Kent fills the gap in scientific understanding of the sensitive plant’s motions with a
poetic treatment of that gap; she allows poetry to reveal the work that science is unable to do,
enabling her to intuit, in the interpretive space that opens up between science and poetry, the
existence of a consciousness whose existence is beyond the bounds of our understanding. Kent’s
works draw on the botanical practice of scientific observation in order to expose the limits of both
scientific and poetic observation, forcing readers to consider the value of consciousnesses (and
sensitivities) we cannot observe. She calls our attention to the questions neither science nor poetry
can ask, to the gap between observable reality and observation and interpretation.
At the heart of Kent’s observations on the sensitive plant is the firm belief that plants must
be understandable, even if they are not understandable to us. Kent presents plants as beings who
might place demands on our attention, or release us from the obligation of attention; beings who
cannot be fully understood, but nonetheless share intersubjective experiences. She allows them to
remain strange even in their familiarity, even as they become more familiar through Kent’s
introductions. Even with the most careful attention to its “wants and habits,” the sensitive plant may
still turn away, or not. We are inclined to interpret this turning away as a response to us, to the care
or harm we mete out, in experiential or experimental environments. But that would be “attention illdirected.”
There’s violence in the assumption that if we pay proper attention to another being, it will,
or must, respond. In the quest to conceive of another being’s consciousness as interpretable by us, we
perhaps make our investigations into its consciousness (or lack thereof) really about us. But in her
descriptions of sensitive plants and senseless weeds, Kent leaves intact the other’s right to love us or
ignore us for no reason that we can perceive.
As the philosopher Michael Marder has recently argued, “the absolute familiarity of plants
coincides with their sheer strangeness.” “More often than not,” he writes, “we overlook trees,
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bushes, shrubs, and flowers in our everyday dealings, to the extent that these plants form the
inconspicuous backdrop of our lives.”34 Like the landscapes that support the mental wanderings of a
poet allowed to withdraw, Marder’s inconspicuous plants blur into an undifferentiated mass of
green. “How,” Marder asks, “is it possible for us to encounter plants? And how can we maintain and
nurture, without fetishizing it, their otherness in the course of this encounter?” Encounters that
would contain plants within systems of classification, that focus on naming a plant and identifying it
with a particular species, he persuasively argues, obscure the plant itself in a series of abstractions
and generalizations. Instead, he suggests, “the idea is to allow plants to flourish on the edge or at the
limit of phenomenality, of visibility, and, in some sense, of ‘the world.’” As Kent puts it, we
encounter plants “beyond” our ability to explain.
While Kent’s works allow readers to identify plants with their type, the artificiality of such
naming becomes clear as scientific and literary systems are applied simultaneously; science, like
literature, abstracts the real. Yet these abstractions allow us to acknowledge an encounter with a
different mode of being. Kent facilitates encounters with plants that disrupt the “green wall” and
allow us to see individual plants by “introducing” her readers to them, their care, and their poetic
treatment.35 Like the killer plants and “strange orchids” that would populate Victorian literature
years later, Kent’s plants have a kind of “narrative agency” that, as Elizabeth Change has argued,
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“radically [alter] notions about sentience, mobility, reproduction, and representation--not least by
blurring distinctions between character and setting.”36 The structure of Kent’s works inclines toward
such blurring, as Kent constructs a hybrid literary form in which the “holding” environment the
natural landscape provides the poet is reconstituted in text as the frame “holding” the poetic results.
In this way, she constructs an intertextual sociality in which plants participate in the same ecosystem
of thought as the Cockney Poets themselves.
And yet, despite Kent’s introductions, and despite their vital presence within a social system,
these plants remain fundamentally strange. Marder contemplates at length the concept of “vegetal
indifference”--that is, a plant’s fundamental indifference to itself (or “its ‘self’”) as a unified being
(132). Plant thinking, in this sense, can never be understood through analogy to human or even
animal thinking, because the sense of the self doing the thinking is so radically different. We lose
sight of this difference in the poetic use of plants as symbols, allegories, and metaphors for the
human condition, rather than for themselves. Kent, by cataloging these poetic uses within the
structure of botanical introductions, centers the relationship between human and plant--she never
allows us to lose sight of the plant itself in the imposed environments of poetic imagination or
scientific classification. The structure of her texts, which encourages readers to consult the book as
they encounter specific plants in nature or poetry, asserts the primacy of a personal relationship, an
encounter with an other being that cannot adequately be described in any genre of human thought.
Like Marder, Kent refuses to “assert an unconditional right of admission into the vegetal world,
which is the world of and for plants, accessible to them” (8-9). Even with a proper introduction,
plants may still withdraw from us, or not; may thrive, or not; may love us in ways we are incapable
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of understanding. Our ethical responsibility is to pay attention without the expectation of full
comprehension.

4. Coda
As I write this article, in 2019, I sit in an office surrounded by plants in various stages of
propagation: a rubber tree rescued from the curb when a neighbor died without relatives; two
sprawling pothos clipped from colleagues’ plants; three paperwhites that do not seem inclined to
flower; six tiny clippings from a jade plant given to me by a dear friend sixteen years ago. The jade
plant once flourished, but my cat ate it and then urinated on it seven years ago; two cuttings from
that first disaster managed to survive before both began, inexplicably, to rot from the roots last
month. The six tiny cuttings, no more than a leaf or two each, are all that now survive. I still think of
all these plants as the original and call them each by the same name; they defy distinction between
individuality and plurality. I do hope that they reward my efforts by thriving.
While I have always loved plants, it must be said that my current fascination is part of a
larger trend. If “put a bird on it” was the dominant aesthetic of 2011, the corresponding catchphrase
for 2019 must surely be “put a plant on it.” In the past two years, it seems every magazine that runs
think-pieces has run at least one think-piece on why Millennials love plants. (I must clarify that,
despite my interest in plants, I am not myself a Millennial.) The generational psychology behind this
trend has been explained in various ways that all reflect on this particular historic moment: it’s
compensation for the delay in parenthood or home ownership forced by strained economic
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conditions;37 it’s a reaction to fears about climate change;38 it’s an expression of self-care;39 it’s for
Instagram.40 These explanations do exactly what explanations of any trends attributed to Millennials
do: homogenize and infantilize a diverse generation that is rapidly entering middle age, while
reducing human encounters to the logic of capitalism. And as cultural critic Kate Wagner put it in a
think-piece responding to these think-pieces, “a general rule of capitalism throughout history is:
what’s good for business is usually bad for living things.”41
The logic of capitalism necessitates the commodification the encounter with the plant; it
transforms living plants into things that can be categorized with a hashtag and monetized at scale.
To resist this, Wagner argues in language strikingly similar to Kent’s, we must recognize that “true
joy of houseplant ownership comes via observation and attention.” We must attune ourselves to
plants as plants, animate in their own slow way, conscious as only plants can be conscious. We must
attend to their differences in order to see them as similarly valuable. “We see plants as inanimate
objects,” Wagner writes,
because they change and react to their environment on a much longer timescale than
animals. We have the mistaken idea that plants do not respond to human love in the same
way that animals do, that plants cannot feel in the traditional sense. No, a houseplant isn’t
the same thing as a dog, but it is closer to a dog than it is to an image of a dog.
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And we have an ethical responsibility to care for houseplants because they are plants. “This caring isn’t
an inconvenience of houseplants,” Wagner stresses, “it is the very reason for having them.” This care
manifests in actions -- maintaining a comfortable environment, attending to the plant’s wants and
needs, talking to the plant and washing its leaves -- but it also manifests in a desire to know the
plants. In the conclusion to her article, Wagner declares, “I’m done with books about which pots
look good with African Violets or how to pair plants with vintage cameras. Tell me what these
plants are, where they come from, why they look and behave the way they do.”
Perhaps it is time once again to attend to Elizabeth Kent, not only as a figure in the history
of literature and science, but as an author who might help us more purposefully observe our
communities that include both human and nonhuman actors. Who better to answer (or gently refuse
to answer) Wagner’s questions: “Why do calatheas have so many variations in their leaf patterns?
Why do some plants fold up at night? How did these plants relate to other species in their native
habitats? Who discovered them and classified them? How have they been used culturally?” Science
can answer some of these questions, poetry others. Both forms of knowledge allow us to encounter
plants in the gap between them, as strangely familiar and worthy, in their strangeness, of our care.
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